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Abstract 
BRANDON GORMAN: Appropriate(d) Democracy: Analyzing Elite Discourse Across North 
Africa 
(Under the direction of Charles Kurzman) 
 
 
 
Political speeches in the contemporary world illustrate a tendency among heads of state 
of appealing to democracy and democratic concepts regardless of regime type. While the 
prevalence of this discourse in countries like the United States is unsurprising, the use of 
discourses of democracy among autocrats presents a puzzle: what are autocrats doing in their 
discursive invocation of democracy?  Current literature on global norms of democratic 
governance suggests that decoupling – or feigning support for democracy without enacting it in 
local institutions – is endemic in discourses which touch upon global norms.  This literature 
suggests that these norms can be either adopted wholesale, decoupled, or rejected wholesale, the 
latter being the rarest configuration. This study seeks to transcend this categorization. I argue that 
discourses of democracy are in fact appropriated discourses, in which global norms interact with 
local interests, issues, and power structures and new definitions of these norms are articulated. 
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 Introduction 
 How do autocrats talk about democracy?  Political speeches in the contemporary world 
illustrate a tendency among heads of state of appealing to democracy and democratic concepts 
regardless of regime type.  While the prevalence of this discourse in countries like the United 
States is unsurprising, the use of discourses of democracy among autocrats presents a puzzle: 
what are autocrats doing in their discursive invocation of democracy?  Democracy is a contested 
concept even in the liberal-democratic West (Dryzek and Holmes 2002), and the lack of a 
concrete and stable definition for democracy has led to both "the debate about what range of 
circumstances should be held to count as a case of [democracy]" as well as "the fact that the use 
of the term democracy performs the speech act of commending what is described" (Skinner 
1973:298–299).  Current literature on global norms of democratic governance suggests that 
decoupling – or feigning support for democracy without enacting it in local institutions – is 
endemic in discourses which touch upon global norms (Meyer et al. 1997).  This literature 
suggests that these norms can be either adopted wholesale, decoupled, or rejected wholesale, the 
latter being the rarest configuration.  This study investigates the “interdiscourse” between global 
norms and local discourses in search of a more nuanced understanding of this relationship as 
well as the “intradiscourse” of democracy in various contexts (Wagner-Pacifici 1994) in order to 
transcend this categorization.  I argue that discourses of democracy are in fact appropriated 
discourses, in which global norms interact with local interests, issues, and power structures and 
new definitions of these norms are articulated. 
 This puzzle is particularly acute in regards to democratic discourse in the Arab world – a 
region with considerable global attention which is characterized as uniquely anti-democratic by 
democratic transitions literature (Diamond 2003) despite evidence of enthusiasm for democracy 
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among Arabs (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Browers 2006; Diamond 2010) and Arab political 
leaders' active use of the language of democracy in official statements and speeches.  This 
project analyzes discourses of democracy in speeches given by heads of state from five North 
African countries – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt – between 2000 and 2010.  
Exploring the use of concepts of political freedom in authoritarian contexts shows that they are 
exceptionally “fuzzy” and fragile.  Results highlight a wider variety of conceptualizations of 
democracy than are recognized in studies of political discourse in established democracies, 
illustrate the interactive nature of the relationship between global and local discourses (Gee 
2011:38–39), and suggest that the configurations of these discourses are driven by local issues 
(Moaddel 2005) in addition to global-cultural discursive hegemony and geopolitical interests.  
Discourses of democracy are thus appropriated – elites articulate alternative definitions, 
challenging the global norm and justifying their actions and policies. 
  
I. Democracy, Decoupling, Discourse, and Appropriation 
 Over the course of history, the concept of democracy has undergone fundamental 
changes and subsequent redefinitions.  The present-day linkage of democracy to liberal-capitalist 
market ideologies (M. Friedman and R. D. Friedman 2002), for example, is a relatively recent 
reversal of the previously-held assumption that democracy was antithetical to the practice of 
commerce (Levin 1992) and diametrically opposed to the Marxian assumption that capitalism is 
incompatible with the equality principle of democracy (Lenin 1992).  Scholars in the traditions 
of comparative government and political development focus on the importance of elections and 
political institutions in guaranteeing equal political influence among citizens (Dahl 2006; Lipset 
1981; Downs 1957) while critics argue that formal-legal rights and procedures are less important 
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than the realities of governance and power relations in deciding what constitutes a democracy 
(Zakaria 1997; O’Donnell 1994; Wolin 2008; Rawls 1971; Diamond 1996; Huntington 1991).  
Still other theories focus on equality of access to technology and education (Dewey 1997), the 
application of democracy to the international (Archibugi, Held, and Köhler 1998) and ecological 
(Phōtopoulos 1997) realms, and more.  The multifaceted and shifting definition of democracy 
has likewise led to controversy surrounding its measurement among social scientists (Bollen 
1990). 
 This brief overview does not even come close to approximating the exceedingly varied 
and protean history of democracy as a concept.  The dominant global discourse on democracy as 
articulated by such intergovernmental organizations as the United Nations, the World Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund put a great deal of emphasis on elections, constitutions, and 
political pluralism (WB, IMF, UN CITE).  Mainstream social science uses a similar set of 
definitions – the most dominant of which1
This discourse is a central example of global culture as espoused by sociological world 
polity literature, which depicts globalization as the “dominant social process of our times” 
 is the standard of “electoral democracy” as defined by 
prevailing literature in political science and the Freedom House organization (Schumpeter 1950; 
Brownlee 2009).  The qualifying criteria for electoral democracy are: 1) a competitive, 
multiparty political system; 2) universal adult suffrage; 3) regularly contested elections with 
secret, secure ballots and the absence of massive voter fraud and 4) significant public access of 
major political parties to the electorate via media outlets through open political campaigning 
(Freedom House 2011). 
                                                 
1 Among many Western political scientists, these criteria constitute minimum requirements for consideration as a 
democracy.  Yet, as has been illustrated, there are many who would take issue with this mainstream 
conceptualization.  This includes scholars who argue that the protection of civil liberties is a fundamental 
requirement for the exercise of true democracy (Dahl 1971; Diamond 2002; Wiarda 2004). 
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(Drori, Jang, and Meyer 2006:224).  This literature suggests that support for democracy is a 
universally accepted value of the generators of and “moral entrepreneurs” (Dezalay and Garth 
1995; Finnemore 1996) of the world polity, NGOs, INGOs, and IGOs (Boli and Thomas 1997).  
The exclusive acceptance of democracy among these modern, agentic actors (Meyer and 
Jepperson 2000) causes alternative models and values to engender very little legitimacy in the 
contemporary world (Meyer et al. 1997:148).  Global culture literature offers three options for 
regimes to deal with a given global norm – they must either: accept it in its entirety, accept it in 
discourse while failing to enact it in local institutions (decoupling), or reject it outright and risk 
delegitimization. This literature argues that political leaders in authoritarian contexts “may settle 
for incorporating the required principle [democracy] in general statements of values and 
identity,” (Meyer et al. 1997).  In the Arab context, some local scholars agree that articulations of 
democracy are dominated by decoupling and empty promises (Ismail, Al-Azmeh CITE).  The 
mainstream trend in political science argues, in parallel with world culture literature, that the 
contemporary world has been ideologically dominated by the concept of liberal democracy since 
the end of the Cold War.  Thus regimes are required to adopt the trappings of democracy, no 
matter how "unjust and bloody-minded" they may be (Fukuyama 2006:16).  Critics claim that 
geopolitical issues dominate discourses of democracy, and that decoupling in the name of 
interests is a trait common among developing countries, Western powers, and international 
institutions (Cavatorta 2001). 
 This study argues that there is another option for regimes to deal with any particular 
global norm – appropriation.  In these appropriated discourses, elites adopt global concepts but 
redefine them in keeping with local priorities and institutions.  There already exists a robust 
literature in political science dealing with indigenous theories of democracy and development 
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which draws on world polity literature but pushes back against the “ethnocentric” Western-based 
theories generally accepted as universal in the social sciences (Wiarda 1983).  This literature 
points to the varieties of democratic institutions, both between the West and non-West as well as 
within the West itself, and argues that local cultures blend with global norms to create altogether 
new political phenomena (Wiarda 2004).  Here the emphasis is on “traditional” political 
institutions as potential gateways to democracy: the shari’a in Islamicate contexts, the caste 
system in India, Catholic corporate hierarchy, the authoritarian Confucian family, African 
tribalism (Wiarda 1983, 2000, 2004), dynastic monarchism in the Gulf states (Herb 1999), and 
more.  The stress in these literatures is on the varieties of democratic institutions across contexts; 
the major contribution of this study comes from its focus on varieties of discourses of 
democracy. 
 Theorists of the critical discourse analysis tradition argue that discourses involving 
democratic values seek to modify both the conceptual understanding of these terms as well as the 
regime's own political identity (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:105).  Discourses revolving around 
democratic concepts present themselves as particularly fruitful for appropriation by political 
regimes; first because the hegemonic global norm promoting democracy as the best form of 
governance must be accommodated by the local discursive field in order to avoid dislocation and 
discursive breakdown (Laclau 1990) and second because democracy itself is a floating signifier 
(Munck 2002), as "its meaning will be different in liberal, radical, anti-fascist and conservative 
anti-communist discourses" (Laclau 1996:208).  Elites in peripheral and semi-peripheral 
countries modify the equivalential totality – or set of concepts considered equivalent to or 
components of a larger floating concept – surrounding democracy through repeated articulation 
in order to establish hegemony in their respective political contexts (Torfing 2005:163) as well as 
6 
 
to challenge the hegemonic global-cultural conception of democracy and renegotiate the 
discursive power dynamic between the center and periphery (Dunne 2003:96). 
 Discourses are “always defined in relationships of complicity and contestation with other 
Discourses,” a fact which complicates the zero-sum assumption of world culture literature (Gee 
2011:38).  The very contours on the boundaries between discourses serves as a means for social 
scientists to gauge worldviews and power relations between  competing institutions and actors, 
as “social discourses both reflect and reproduce power relations that ‘live’ in social structures” 
on both the local and international levels (Wagner-Pacifici 1994:4).  Although dominant 
institutions attempt to determine the “rules of the game” and “contours of sayability” challengers 
often try to re-interpret or change these for their own benefit (Gee 2011).  The theory of ujamaa 
propagated by Tanzania’s Nyerere is a good example of this kind of interaction.  Translated as 
“African socialism” or “African democracy,” ujamaa as a political theory exhibits intellectual 
characteristics of European theories as well as local ideas about power relations (Stöger-Eising 
2000), indicating that the contours of this discursive formation were formed in interactions 
between globally hegemonic discourses and appropriated counterdiscourses. 
 Local elites, rather than ascribing to the global-cultural definition of democracy 
wholesale, decoupling, or rejecting it wholesale, offer new definitions of democracy which 
challenge global norms while simultaneously appropriating selected world cultural values.  The 
key hypothesis underlying this study is that elites in non-democratic regimes challenge the global 
cultural norm of democracy by attempting to alter its definition through discourse rather than 
simply "faking it" via disingenuous lip service or rejecting it entirely.  An appropriated discourse 
is one in which a global-cultural norm is acknowledged as important but its definition is 
challenged by the articulation of a new definition with non-global-cultural elements.  In an 
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appropriated discourse, the global normative concept (here, democracy) is invoked positively but 
equated with other concepts that are either unmentioned or disparaged in the dominant global 
discourse. 
 
II. Method 
 This project analyzes speeches given by heads of state between 2000 and 2010 from five 
North African countries – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.  The total volume of 
data consists of 1,742 speeches (sampling units) gathered from state information ministry 
websites.  The analyzed speeches begin in 2000 and end in 2010 in order to maximize 
comparability between the various country-specific contexts.  In addition to sharing a common 
geographical neighborhood, all five countries were ruled by a single head of state and all five 
had speeches published on official websites for the aforementioned time period.  Likewise, a 
focus on the post-2000 time period will control for the effects of the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals – the adoption of which should lead to either policy convergence (Drezner 
2001) or decoupling and “empty promises” (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005) and thus impact 
political discourse, particularly in developing countries.  In most instances, speeches are 
available in either English or French as well as in the original Arabic.  This will allow for cross-
referencing translations.  At this time, the only speeches analyzed are those with English or 
French translations.  I plan to read and translate the approximately 80 (###) speeches which are 
only available in Arabic and add them to the analysis at a later time. 
 Speeches are searched for truncated key terms (democ- in English and French, 
dimuqraaT- in Arabic) which are limited to democracy and its derivatives (democratic, 
democratization, etc.).  A subset of context units is created including only those in which the 
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truncated key terms appear (roughly 46% of speeches).  Coding unit excerpts are then identified 
based on a qualitative reading, beginning where the subject of democracy is initially introduced 
and ending when the subject is changed.  These excerpts are read for patterns, trends, and 
differences in repeated conceptualizations of democracy across the four countries during the 
specified time period.  Two specific usages of “democ-” related terms were removed from 
coding: those that are names of countries or institutions (i.e., the People’s Democratic Republic 
of Algeria) and the names of political parties (i.e., Tunisia’s Constitutional Democratic Rally).  
The following table illustrates the scope of the project as defined by collected speeches in Table 
1. 
Excerpts were loaded into a custom computer program which presented a randomly-
selected excerpt devoid of context (date, speaker, audience, etc.) for coding, although in many 
cases this contextual information could be inferred from the text (Perrin 2005).  The key question 
to be addressed is: how are North African elites defining democracy in their official speeches 
and statements?  An extensive set of 84 codes was developed using a form of “expert coding” – 
relying on my knowledge and personal judgment to inform the use of historical and contextual 
information (Krippendorff 2004).  The developed codes2
                                                 
2 More detailed information on the excerpting and coding process can be found in Appendix A: Coding Process and 
Appendix B: Coding Rules. 
 are based both on concepts anticipated 
prior to reading the speeches drawn from relevant scholarly literatures (“etic”) as well as on 
repeated articulations encountered during the coding process (“emic”), with excerpts revisited to 
ensure consistency in coding (Easter 2008).  In order to capture the full scope of hybridity and 
ambiguity in the use of democratic language by elites in these contexts, codes are not mutually 
exclusive, and Arabic originals were consulted to clarify vague or ambiguous passages.  All 
variables produced by the initial coding process were binary, with scores of “1” indicating 
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presence of a particular theme or trope and scores of “0” representing its absence.  Table 2 
illustrates the universe of codes used during this process, along with the mean value of each of 
these dichotomous variables. 
Next, these 84 variables were reduced to 46 via a process of collapsing the originals into 
substantively meaningful categories.  The initial coding process was extensive and specific for 
the sake of accuracy, but arriving at meaningful statistical results with such a large number of 
variables – many of them with very low mean scores – is difficult and cumbersome, and in this 
case would be unlikely to result in any additional analytical leverage.  Table 3 gives the example 
of the new aggregate variable, positive references to representative democracy, which was 
derived from five substantively related but individually rare components – representation, 
elections, referenda, pluralism, and participation of citizens abroad.  As a result of this 
aggregation, 17 variables were created out of 53 variables from the initial coding phase.  The 
complete list of these aggregated variables, their composite variables, and means can be found in 
Table 4.  Table 5 lists the universe of variables used for the study and the relevant descriptive 
statistics for each.  Subsequent statistical analyses rely on logistic regression models using the 
remaining dichotomous variables. 
 
III. Global Culture in Democratic Discourse among Autocrats 
 To a degree, North African autocrats accept the claims and norms of the international 
system when it comes to democracy – with international organizations typically described as 
legitimate expressions of universal values: 
[Tunisia] has also been keen on ensuring the correlation between the social and 
economic dimensions in the development process, strengthening the components 
of civil society, reinforcing democracy and human rights, and enlarging relations 
of cooperation and solidarity between brotherly and friendly countries… Today, 
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we consider common action within international institutions and bodies, 
particularly the United Nations, the best framework for the settlement of problems 
and crises facing humanity (Ben Ali 2003.02.24). 
 
There has been on the global level a lot of talk recently about reform and 
democracy. They are attractive slogans that can only be rejected by a dictator or a 
reactionary… The peak and head of the world is the United Nations. The General 
Assembly is our world’s parliament (Qaddafi 2006.05.08). 
 
More specifically, definitions of representative democracy and the creation of a democratic 
political culture – two of the most common themes in both the discourse of international 
institutions (UN, WB, IMF CITE) and academic literature on global culture (Boli and Thomas 
1997), are widely adopted by these autocrats (even Qaddafi to some extent, whose political 
philosophy is diametrically opposed to representation): 
[D]emocracy is a social behavior before being a system or a political approach 
adopted by the state, whereby it guarantees all constituents that maintain and 
activate democracy (Mubarak 2003.11.19). 
 
The total success of the election of April 8 now places our country among the 
most advanced nations in terms of the maturity of its people and evidence [of our 
people’s] sense of civic responsibility and their adherence to democracy in our 
country (Bouteflika 2004.04.09). 
 
Here we find exhortation of constitutionalism, elections, referenda, and local democratic 
institutions – ideas well in-line with global-cultural definitions as defined by international 
organizations.  This is the area of discourse the most prone to decoupling (Meyer et al. 1997) and 
empty promises (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), as these representative institutions in 
authoritarian regimes are often used to reinforce elite solidarity and manage opposition groups 
(Brownlee 2007, 2009; Albrecht and Wegner 2006). 
 Another highly popular theme among North African autocrats is centered on the necessity 
of authentic and indigenous democratic institutions – a sentiment expressed by international 
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organizations (UN CITE) and reinforced by academic circles (Wiarda 1983, 2004).  All of the 
political leaders in this study are keen to make this point: 
Morocco and Spain are not the same, and they never will be.  Democracy in Spain 
should be perfectly adapted to Spain, and there is a democratic model specific to 
Morocco (Mohammed VI 2000.06.20). 
 
We are completing the pillars of our democracy; enhancing pluralism and 
energizing our political life. In so doing, we are applying home-grown reforms 
that are sensitive to our society's conditions and idiosyncrasies (Mubarak 
2008.05.18). 
 
This authenticity does not only have a cultural basis – indigenous forms of democracy are useful 
for solving indigenous problems.  There is a focus on outcomes in this area of the discourse, both 
among international organizations (UN, WB CITE) as well as among the political elites in this 
study.  The eradication of poverty, empowerment of women and marginalized groups, and 
improvement of education systems are all heavily emphasized: 
[T]here is no free press [since] the poor cannot publish a newspaper. A newspaper 
is published by a corporation, and the rich own the newspapers. These newspapers 
are founded by this class to serve its interests. Hence, they are guided, controlled, 
forced to pursue a certain policy and are not free (Qaddafi 2005.09.19). 
 
[W]omen are not absent from the political, ministerial posts or MPs in our 
legislatures. Their presence in these political addresses a requirement for 
democracy since women make up half of our population and represent an 
important educational value. Their presence within the Government is a sign of 
women's participation in managing state affairs (Bouteflika 2009.03.08). 
 
What would indeed become of political rights without a solid economic, social 
and cultural foundation? Could one fully enjoy these rights in a society suffering 
from unemployment, poverty, illiteracy? [...] The same goes for the protection of 
social classes with specific needs, such as children, the elderly and the disabled 
(Ben Ali 2008.10.18). 
 
These leaders have even been quite effective at dealing with some of these issues deemed 
important by global-cultural standards.  Tunisia, for example, enjoys the highest rate of female 
participation in parliament in the Middle East, even higher than in the United States and Canada 
12 
 
(Moghadam 1999), and Ben Ali’s National Solidarity Fund project was eventually adopted by 
the United Nations in the form of the World Solidarity Fund (Sadiki 2002a).  This indicates a 
mutual recognition between the international system and autocrats as “moral entrepreneurs” 
responsible for creation and implementation of global-cultural norms (Dezalay and Garth 1995). 
 
IV. Appropriated Discourses of Democracy in North Africa  
 
Common Themes  
 Discourses of democracy among North African autocrats also share many themes that do 
not match global-cultural norms of democracy.  First, there is a great deal of focus on the regime 
or leader as proof of democracy as opposed to the political system itself – in many cases, this is 
the most common theme.  This directly contradicts the global-normal definition of democracy, 
which tends to emphasize accountability over authority and security of property over loyalty to 
the leader or regime (Drori, Meyer, and Hwang 2006; Jang 2005).  Loyalty to the leader or 
regime is equated with loyalty to the nation, without which, the territorial integrity and unity of 
the nation may be compromised: 
We have established our process of democracy and pluralism on the basis of a 
sound strategy. This strategy includes a commitment to freedom and 
responsibility as two complementary values, and accords a special place to the 
respect of laws so as to preserve the country’s integrity, invulnerability, stability 
and security, and to achieve, in a gradual and comprehensive manner, the 
objectives of our comprehensive civilizational project which has won the 
unanimous support of Tunisian men and women, and avoided all kinds of 
demagogical posturing which runs against prudent political behavior. 
Guaranteeing freedom of thought, expression and opinion is indissociable from 
this choice so long as intentions are sincere, and as long as the objectives are 
noble, and the national interest is the only and ultimate stake (Ben Ali 
2006.07.25). 
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Our approach is in line with the way that our venerated ancestors adopted to 
protect the safety of Morocco and the spiritual unity of the Maliki rite… Indeed, 
we consider our commitment to our doctrinal unity in the religious sphere similar 
to our constitutional commitment to defend the territorial integrity and national 
unity of the motherland (Mohammed VI 2004.04.30). 
 
The focus here is on the strategy of the leader, and a transcendent sense of national unity which 
preempts global-cultural norms of democracy including freedom of opinion, association, 
transparency, and political accountability. 
 Next, we find inclinations towards corporatism and the Islamic notion of shura, or 
consultation, acting as substitutes for the global-cultural emphasis on civil society (Boli and 
Thomas 1997): 
Such participation of Economic and Social Councils should be emphasized, as it 
is true that these institutions have become highly symbolic of the new models of 
representation and governance, which can articulate the specific action for the 
harmonization and standardization between government authorities and civil 
society organizations… In this regard, it is increasingly clear that organized civil 
society has a mandate to ensure democratic and participatory listening which 
finds its natural extension in the areas of dialogue and consultation (Bouteflika 
2005.11.26). 
 
These civil society organizations tend to be tightly controlled and limited in their ability to act 
(Sadiki 2002b:510), and thus do not reflect the global-cultural definition of civil society.  In fact, 
the corporatist model is emphatically not a part of the international definition of democracy 
(Meyer and Jepperson 2000), as it is often discursively linked to exclusivity, a lack of 
competition, and an unhealthy closeness between the state and its presumed counterbalance – 
civil society.  Likewise, shura is an Islamic concept that is not part of the global-cultural 
definition of democracy but is regularly invoked in Islamicate contexts. 
 Finally, these autocrats’ discourses on democracy exhibit tendencies of Third Worldism 
which do not match up with global-cultural articulations.  On a number of occasions, these 
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discourses challenge the very usefulness of representative democracy in solving problems like 
security, economic development, socioeconomic inequality, and social justice: 
Is the election an end in itself, marking the ultimate culmination of our journey? 
Certainly not, because respect for the popular will requires an abandonment of the 
mentality of democracy of seats, in favor of a free adherence to the virtues of 
democracy's development… [Democracy] must be a synergistic and permanent 
relationship with citizens rather than an exercise in circumstances that lasts only 
the time of elections (Mohammed VI 2003.10.10). 
 
Originally, the party is formed to represent the people. Then the leading group of 
the party represents its members and the supreme leader of the party represents 
the leading group. It becomes clear that the party game is a deceitful farce based 
on a sham form of democracy which has a selfish content based on maneuvers, 
tricks and political games. All these emphasize that the party-system is a 
dictatorial, yet modern, instrument (Qaddafi 1983:15). 
 
Democracy is also depicted as potentially dangerous, especially in the Third World: 
Designed in principle to civilize the conflict, our democratic experiment has 
induced a wave of brutal violence that has produced at times and in places a 
genuine regression of the principles of humanity. Designed in principle to open 
spaces for debate based on freedom of expression and confrontation of opinions it 
gave birth at certain times and in certain sectors of society, a furious rise of 
extremism accompanied by anathemas, to arrogance and bigotry.  Designed in 
principle to improve the functioning of the state and to acquire a new legitimacy, 
it has, at times, threatened its very existence (Bouteflika 2005.06.07). 
 
[D]emocracy, if practiced by democrats, provides an important tool for 
comprehensive development, while if it is tainted by irregular election practices it 
could become a burden for the nation (Mohammed VI 2000.10.13). 
 
Democratization is articulated not only as a domestic issue, but also an international one.  These 
discourses are rife with calls for a more democratic international system based on a 
cosmopolitian notion of democracy between states (Archibugi et al. 1998; Munck 2002): 
As long as the world does not exercise democracy in the so-called United Nations, 
the highest political institution in the world, the call for democracy in any country 
in the world cannot be taken seriously (Qaddafi 2006.05.08). 
 
In the next millennium, there is no doubt that humans will colonize space, perhaps 
we will live as long as the redwoods, we will fight wars without engaging staff, 
kill at a distance by intangible weapons and achieve many others feats, but can we 
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eradicate hunger and disease worldwide, achieve global democracy governed by 
fair rules for all, establish between us a community of interest and beliefs, the 
only guarantee of world peace (Bouteflika 2000.10.21)? 
 
We are calling for a new political, economic, and commercial world order; an 
order that is more just and balanced; one free of discrimination and double-
standards, and which achieves the interests of all; one which takes into 
consideration the concerns and priorities of developing countries, and establishes 
democracy as the basis for dealings between rich and poor states (Mubarak 
2009.07.15). 
 
The international community – and particularly the West – is challenged on the grounds that it is 
hypocritical, seeking to promote democratization only where its interests are best suited.  Again 
and again, reference is made to areas where Western interests take precedent over democracy 
promotion: namely Palestine and Iraq. 
 
Appropriated Discourse in Tunisia: Centralist Corporatism 
 Former Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power on November 7, 1987 
by ousting his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, in a bloodless coup.  Among Ben Ali’s stated 
commitments from the beginning of his reign were creating political pluralism in Tunisia, the 
elimination of life presidency, and gradual democratization (Sadiki 2002b).  While some 
observers were initially optimistic about the potential for real political change in Tunisia 
(Anderson 1991), more recently it has been argued that the only kind of transition that has taken 
place since 1987 “has been from single party rule to ruling party hegemony,” with many 
Bourguiba-era practices remaining in place, albeit cloaked in discourses of pluralism and 
representation (Sadiki 2002b:505).   Despite similarities to the discursive definition of 
democracy in Mubarak’s Egypt, speeches given by Ben Ali show a marked preoccupation with 
pluralism, the avant-garde role of the ruling party, and corporatism, as evidenced by Figure 1 
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and the results of the multinomial logistic regression3
 An ongoing theme in Ben Ali’s discursive invocation of democracy is the reification of 
the ruling RCD as a vanguard of democracy, repeatedly highlighting its importance on the 
national stage.  Combined with this are elements of democratic centralism, with Ben Ali and the 
RCD leadership “acting as though it embodies the entire will of the country, not just its 
members” (Sadiki 2002a:135): 
 in Table 6, which indicates that Ben Ali is 
by far the most likely leader to invoke these themes. 
[W]e continue to endeavor to make of the RCD a school for democracy, both as a 
matter of thought and practice. Since the beginning of the Change, we have relied 
on the RCD to be an avant-garde Party, the Party of democratic choice which is 
one of our national constants and one of the foundations of our reform project 
(Ben Ali 2008.07.18). 
 
Here we see a continuation of two Bourguiba-era discursive formations: l’Etat-patron (state as 
tutelary) and l’Etat-parti (state as party) (Belkhodja 1998:131) albeit in a watered-down form 
due to the commitment to pluralism.  Still, democracy, pluralism, and political maturity are all 
said to originate in and emanate from the center – occupied by the Ben Ali and the RCD. 
 One result of the outspoken commitment to pluralism and the characterization of the 
ruling RCD as a vanguard for democracy in Tunisia is the emergence of a carefully controlled 
electoral regime (Sadiki 2002b:497) where token opposition is permitted but the ruling party is 
virtually guaranteed legislative hegemony (Brownlee 2009).  Since Ben Ali’s political power 
rests, at least in part, on the hegemony of the RCD in the parliament, “the toleration of dissent 
and contention within parliament must remain decidedly limited” (Albrecht and Wegner 
2006:129).  This is reconciled with the commitment to pluralism via an exclusionary legal 
regime – controlled by Ben Ali and the RCD – which allows for the legalization of new parties 
                                                 
3 Run with robust standard errors using a clustered sandwich estimator with speech date as the cluster variable, since 
speeches given by a particular leader on a particular day are likely to be similar, potentially violating the 
independence of observations assumption.  This correction allows for intragroup correlation. 
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only if they do not represent strong social forces (Albrecht and Wegner 2006:129).  These parties 
are regularly referenced as evidence of the irreversible march of Tunisian democracy, despite the 
fact that the RCD regularly garners more than 80% of the vote in elections: 
Since the Change… [w]e have adopted a constant process through which we have 
promoted political life, enlarged the scope of participation for all political parties 
to contribute to anchoring democracy, and allowed all political and intellectual 
tendencies to assume their role in national action. We consider this diversity a 
source of enrichment for the country's progress, which has recently been 
reinforced by the creation of a new political party, the Green Party for Progress 
(Ben Ali 2006.03.20). 
 
These legally-recognized minor parties owe their political survival to Ben Ali and the ruling 
RCD (Sadiki 2002a), who control them via quotas and state subsidies: 
Since the Change, we have made successive initiatives… our aim being to 
consecrate our democratic choice in daily life and reinforce pluralism in our 
constitutional institutions. We have encouraged political parties, provided support 
to them and to their press, offered them the possibility to obtain seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Had it not been for our initiatives, this would never have 
been possible (Ben Ali 2004.10.10). 
 
[W]e have offered Opposition parties the possibility to be represented in these 
[local] councils by 20%, provided they have seats in the municipals councils of 
the concerned region, in addition to their representatives in the Chamber of 
Deputies; the aim being to make of regional councils propitious forums for the 
active participation of all (Ben Ali 2005.11.07). 
 
These parties, since they do not truly represent social forces of any significant strength, must pay 
deference to the RCD and Ben Ali – the result of which is a hegemonic univocal political 
discourse bolstered by formal pluralism (Sadiki 2002a:131). 
 Party-hegemonic authoritarian regimes have a tendency towards banning potential rival 
centers of power, and the corporatist model is useful in this regard for ensuring that “the 
merchant classes and the rising middle classes profit economically by rallying to the regime 
rather than from confronting it” (Durac and Cavatorta 2009).  This allows the regime to interfere 
with and control the political space occupied by civil society, including trade unions and 
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voluntary associations (Sadiki 2002b:498), in much the same way that it controls political 
parties.  Here, the corporatist model of democracy consists of institutionalized interest 
representation and consultation: 
[W]e have been keen on establishing relations of consultation and entente among 
the various social and professional partners, and adopting a comprehensive, just 
and balanced national development, without any exclusion or marginalization.  In 
this regard, we have endeavored to optimize the relations between the various 
development sectors and to consecrate their complementarity and 
interdependence, in such a way as to ensure the correlation between their 
economic and social dimensions on the one hand, and democracy and human 
rights protection on the other hand. (Ben Ali 2004.07.25). 
 
As with political parties, interest representation in Tunisia is limited to units created or approved 
by the state which are singular, non-competitive, and hierarchically ordered (Sadiki 2002b:510), 
and there is no room “for the setting up, in the name of public liberties, of illegal bodies that 
style themselves as associations, organizations or committees” (Ben Ali 2000.07.28).  Those that 
are legally recognized enjoy not only state subsidies but also formal representation in governing 
institutions – specifically the Chamber of Advisors, where representatives of these legal 
corporatist units hold a third of the seats (Majlis al-Mustashariin 2011), the functional equivalent 
of a quota.  The regime is also very interested in co-opting Tunisia’s historically-powerful 
unions, including the UGTT, with which it has had an on-again, off-again formal relationship 
(Moore 1962; Sadiki 2002b). 
 The tendencies towards vanguard centralism and corporatism in Ben Ali’s discourse of 
democracy both represent a propensity for centralization defined as pluralism (Ayubi 1996; 
Levitsky and Way 2002), with inclusion in the political system requiring co-optation as a 
prerequisite.  Yet, despite the documented rejection of such corporatist centralism in the global 
culture literature (Meyer and Jepperson 2000:108–109), we do not find many direct challenges to 
the hegemonic global norm.  This result is unsurprising given Tunisia’s record of approval from 
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such international organizations as the World Bank (Sadiki 2002a) as well as the United States 
and European Union, which have historically lauded Ben Ali’s dedication to democracy and 
human rights (Durac and Cavatorta 2009).  Nonetheless, this calls the international community’s 
commitments to its own norms into question. 
 
Appropriated Discourse in Egypt –Neoliberalism 
 Former Egyptian president Muhammad Hosni Mubarak assumed office on October 14, 
1981 following the assassination of his predecessor, Anwar El Sadat.  Like Ben Ali, Mubarak 
was initially hailed as a potential liberalizer (Brownlee 2007:1), promising gradual political 
opening and continued state support of the underprivileged, although history has shown his intent 
to retain “control over party operations, elections, and civil society” (Brownlee 2007:93).  Unlike 
Ben Ali’s Tunisia, however, Egypt under Mubarak was known as a “triple hybrid” regime, with 
elements of military, party-hegemonic, and personalistic rule (Geddes 2003).  This hybridity is 
evidenced in discourse by references to the military and internal security apparatus (amn ad-
dawla) as guarantors of democracy, which can be seen in Figure 2. 
 As can be seen in Figure 1, the Egyptian discourse of democracy has several 
characteristics in common with Tunisia – including an emphasis on corporatism and vanguard 
centralism.  In Egypt, as in Tunisia, the regime co-opts or suppresses elite rivals and alternative 
political movements with a popular base, thus building a robust and diverse ruling party coalition 
(Brownlee 2007:35).  Both use institutional tools, such as legal recognition, to control the 
political sphere and create a loyal opposition (Albrecht and Wegner 2006): 
Greetings to all national parties that contribute with parliamentary endeavors to 
enriching our democratic march, enhancing respect by the society for its 
legitimate institutions, entrenching values of proper political action committed to 
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open presence and legitimate channels and considerate of any decision once 
issued by a conscious majority through free voting (Mubarak 2001.11.10). 
 
In both contexts the NGO field is also co-opted and tightly controlled (Albrecht 2005).  Like the 
RCD in Tunisia, the Egyptian National Democratic Party (NDP) is celebrated as a vanguard 
party, and democratic centralism is lauded as an important mechanism for the democratization of 
the nation: 
Another highlight of this General Congress was the adoption by the Party of a 
new modality for formulating general policies and developing conceptions and 
orientations on a number of significant issues. This means that the door will be 
open to an integrated democratic discussion and dialogue on such policies and 
issues on various levels at the Party, starting from party units through other levels 
up to the General Congress (Mubarak 2002.09.18). 
 
The fact of co-optation is not lost on opposition parties and NGOs, some of whom are proud to 
declare their “special agreements” with the regime and publicly “come to the tacit agreement that 
Egypt is not yet ‘ripe’ for democracy” (Albrecht 2005:384), working with the regime to assign 
“cognitive duties” to citizens in order to create an appropriate atmosphere for the gradual 
continuation of democratic reform (Dunne 2003:98).  Like Ben Ali, Mubarak also tends to 
identify himself as personally “believing [in], taking positions on, having confidence in, 
stressing, talking, and wishing about democracy” (Dunne 2003:77). 
 Where the Egyptian discourse stands out is in regards to neoliberalism and privatization 
(al-khaskhasa) as key components of democracy.  This relationship is illustrated visually by 
Figure 1, which shows the net positive references to neoliberalism by speaker.  In terms of 
defining neoliberalism as a component of democracy and a public good, we can see in Table 6 
that Mubarak, and Algeria’s Bouteflika, and Morocco’s Mohammed VI are statistically as likely 
as one another4
                                                 
4 While the relative risk ratios indicate that Mubarak is the most likely to invoke this discourse, the coefficients fail 
to achieve statistical significance. 
 to invoke this discourse, while Ben Ali are and Libya’s Qaddafi are statistically 
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less likely.  Where Mubarak stands out is in his reluctance to criticize or question neoliberalism 
and privatization.  The results of Table 6 also indicate that all of the other leaders in the study 
(with the exception of Qaddafi) are more likely than Mubarak to define neoliberalism as a 
potential threat or dangerous experiment. 
 While the global-cultural literature is likely to attribute this nearly-entirely positive 
assessment of neoliberalism to a desire to “fit in” to world culture, area experts point to shifts 
within the domestic elite to explain this phenomenon.  Many would recognize this neoliberal 
focus as a new phenomenon, a the product of an internal struggle within the NDP between the 
Nasserist/Socialist “old guard” and the businessman-politicians of the “new guard” led by Gamal 
Mubarak and his allies in the rejuvenated business community (Brownlee 2007:132).  As can be 
seen in Figure 3, there has been an overall increase in articulations linking neoliberalism and 
privatization to democracy, with a significant rise after 2003 – a year of intraelite turmoil in 
which in which the NDP old guard, including general secretary Safwat Sherif and deputy general 
secretary Kamal al-Shazli were “compelled to adopt Gamal Mubarak’s reform discourse at the 
party’s annual conference,” marking a distinct shift in the discourse of the ruling party towards 
articulations of concepts of economic freedom, equality of opportunity, the promise of social 
mobility, and promotion of investment (Albrecht 2005:381).  Noting in 2002 that Egyptian 
institutions recently “had to learn for the first time to deal with adversity in a market-based 
system, driven by the private sector,” (Mubarak 2002.03.06) the post-2003 era exhibits a marked 
shift: 
As we proceed towards further political reform and completing the structure of 
our democracy, we have to proceed daringly and bravely with more economic 
reform and economic liberalization. Our national economy has already overcome 
years of slowdown, recovering its ability to attract more foreign, Arab and 
Egyptian investments and last year it achieved a rate of growth unmatched over 
the past ten years (Mubarak 2006.09.21). 
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Cooperation means self-independence according to available potentials even 
when they are limited. No doubt that self-independence, along with sound and 
free cooperative planning, void of any guardianship, is qualified to realize prompt 
national development that leads to economic freedom, which is the base of all 
political and social freedom.  (Mubarak 2008.12.23). 
 
It is worth noting that the only negative reference to neoliberalism in the sample occurs in mid-
2000, with Mubarak stating that “the current trends of the world economy [do] not help realize 
humanity's sublime target,” leaving four-fifths of the world’s population impoverished (Mubarak 
2000.06.19). 
 This combination of elite-led neoliberal reform and the “diffidence” of capital in Egypt 
towards political democracy (Bellin 2000) resulted in what some observers describe as crony 
capitalism (Brownlee 2008:77).  This configuration proved satisfactory both to foundational 
institutions of global culture like the IMF (Brownlee 2007:132) as well as global and regional 
power brokers like the United States (Brownlee 2008:73) despite continued manipulation of 
elections.  However, Mubarak has continued to rail against the international order, advocating 
the creation of a more democratic international system and identifying himself as a leading figure 
in the Non-Aligned Movement.  Likewise, despite the continued oppositional discursive 
association of Mubarak with the United States and Israel (Schemm 2003), he has consistently 
“attempted to smear all of his opponents as foreign puppets,” distancing himself from both 
international institutions and geopolitically-important powers (Brownlee 2008:83).  This 
indicates the relative weakness of the influence of both global-cultural norms and geopolitical 
calculation in relation to local imperatives when it comes to articulating democracy (Brownlee 
2007:203). 
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 Appropriated Discourse in Algeria – Security First 
 Current Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power in April of 1999 
following a widely-boycotted election (Quandt 2002).  Compared to the other rulers in this study, 
there was not much Western enthusiasm around his rise to power – he was known to have been 
the candidate endorsed by the military apparatus (Bouandel 2003), which had been heavily 
involved in Algerian politics since the cancelled elections that began the decade-long civil war in 
1999.  Since then, Bouteflika has been re-elected twice in what have been called “the fairest and 
freest [elections] held in the Arab world” up until that point (Parks 2005:99), and has seemingly 
worked to professionalize the military and limit its role in politics (Holm 2005).  Unlike in Egypt 
and Tunisia, the presidential coalition in Algeria generally does not win parliamentary majorities 
(Parks 2005), and Algeria is the only presidential system in the Arab world in which opposition 
parties are well-represented during the time period under investigation (Langohr 2004:190).  As 
such, there is less reliance in the Algerian discourse on vanguardism and corporatism, and 
Bouteflika (with Qaddafi) is the least likely of all the leaders in this study to make reference to 
himself or his regime directly, as is indicated in Table 6. 
 The 1991-2002 Algerian Civil War is recognized as one of the most violent in recent 
history – resulting in an estimated loss of life approaching 200,000 individuals.  Explanations for 
this extreme level of bloodshed often point to Algeria’s pre-colonial social fragmentation and the 
subsequent French colonial strategy which set out to destroy the existing tribal kinship networks 
and exact direct control over the Algerian population (Charrad 2001:132).  This history of social 
disunity and brutal colonial violence resulted in the emergence of a “traditionalism of despair” in 
Algeria and an exacerbation of factionalist tendencies in response to violence and oppression 
(Hermassi 1972:66), a theme which plays a prominent role in Bouteflika’s political discourse: 
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Algeria has suffered more than any other Arab country from the policy of 
occupation, until the recovery of our freedom and sovereignty (Bouteflika 
2002.04.21) 
 
The colonizer believed he was able to erase the identity of nations, on which he 
had a stranglehold, so that it is easy to impose his will, his culture and social 
project, and therefore the deviate from the historical path of the colonized... 
Civilizing the people, spreading the culture of light and liberal democracy, and the 
establishment of peace are, among others, the concepts used as pretexts to justify 
the hidden designs of the colonizer (Bouteflika 2004.10.31) 
 
[D]ue to a longer, more brutal, barbaric, and de-structuring colonial domination 
than in the rest of the Maghreb and the Arab world, democracy here has been 
primarily driven by impoverished masses. It has been intimately linked to the 
demand for national independence, and improvement of living conditions 
(Bouteflika 2006.04.16). 
 
The outbreak of the civil war and the extreme violence which characterized it tend to be blamed 
on Algeria’s societal unpreparedness for democracy, both academically (Testas 2005; Heristchi 
2004) and popularly.  In Bouteflika’s discourse, the lack of societal preparedness leading to the 
failed “democratic experiment” is a result of colonialism and forced underdevelopment: 
The causes [of the failed democratic experiment] are multiple. The main one 
identified is the genocide perpetrated by French colonization on the Algerian 
people through a systematic policy of depersonalization and total erasure of all 
identity markers of the Nation.  This cruel impasse was fortunately averted by the 
return to the front of the stage key players of the state and particularly the 
People’s National Army (PNA), stopping the election process in January 1992 in 
a patriotic and Republican desire to halt the absurd drift that led the democratic 
experience astray (Bouteflika 2005.06.07). 
 
Here the period of military rule (and, to some extent, the continued presence of the PNA in 
politics) are depicted as a necessary corrective measure to reverse the impact of colonialism on 
Algerian society. 
 Following Bouteflika’s election in 1999, he immediately dedicated himself to ending the 
civil war and the amelioration of the security situation (Holm 2005:122).  To this end, he 
introduced a policy of “civil concord” – offering amnesty to former insurgents who would agree 
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to renounce violence (Quandt 2002:19).  The policy was put to a national referendum in 
September of 1999, which passed overwhelmingly and gave Bouteflika “an infusion of popular 
support that the tarnished election of April had not provided” (Mortimer 2006:162).  The level of 
violence was substantially reduced as a result (Mortimer 2006:162; Quandt 2002:18), to 
Bouteflika’s credit on the domestic and international scene (Mortimer 2006:162; Holm 
2005:119).  Bouteflika himself is keen to appropriate the success of civil concord, citing 
increased security as an important prerequisite for a second, more successful democratic 
experiment:  
Fully mobilized to overcome and restore peace and security, we initiated a project 
of political renewal and economic recovery, in a process of civil concord with 
which the people have massively agreed and which has enabled Algeria gradually 
recover its unity and stability and boost… political life on a democratic basis 
(Bouteflika 2001.10.16). 
 
After a decade of indiscriminate terrorism, Algeria is regaining its balance and 
resuming a normal life while tending its wounds under its ruins. You know that I 
have initiated a bold policy of national reconciliation aimed at mitigating 
resentment and attempts at revenge to achieve the social peace necessary for our 
recovery (Bouteflika 2005.05.30). 
 
The improved security situation led directly to an increase in Bouteflika’s popular support 
among Algerians.  He was able to win re-election in 2005 by relying on the civil concord policy 
as his crowning achievement, along with promises of increased social services (Parks 2005), and 
despite popular, politically-entrenched challengers and even opposition by the military 
(Mortimer 2006:155).  Domestic and international observers reported little election fraud, and no 
clear evidence of cheating was ever produced by the opposition, who took up the post-election 
position that proof of fraud was impossible to come by “because those who are committed to it 
[were] geniuses of electoral holdups” (Parks 2005:102). 
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 Bouteflika has also been credited with attempting to limit military involvement in politics 
during his tenure, wanting to be a “100% president” (Mortimer 2006:163).  This position is 
articulated discursively via a two-pronged approach: first, military rule is defined as inherently 
undemocratic, and second, it is deemed unnecessary due to the success of civil concord: 
The PNA has also contributed to objectively establish the conditions conducive to 
the accomplishment of the process to lead the country towards a democratic state 
of law, republican, modern and in exclusive service of its citizens (Bouteflika 
2003.07.03). 
 
The PNA, who had to take responsibility in a situation of exceptional institutional 
decay and imminent danger to the country, has expressed his willingness to 
actually confirm the final return to constitutional order. It did so by staying away 
from political debate and standing - in Republican discipline - to serve the nation 
and people expressing their sovereign will and choice (Bouteflika 2004.07.04). 
 
Thus what Le Monde has called “The Bouteflika Effect” has reconfigured the Algerian political 
system to place “the presidency and the state apparatus at the centre” (Mortimer 2006:169), a 
reconfiguration that is “democratic” but required the internal security wrought by the 
Bouteflika’s civil concord policy as a prerequisite.  As a result, academic circles in the past 
decade have moved from the assumption that the military is “firmly in control” in Algeria 
(Cavatorta 2001) towards a model where the military is extracted from politics – at least partially 
(Parks 2005). 
 The “traditionalism of despair” in Algerian political culture – a result of the bloody and 
disastrous history of colonialism and an aborted democratic experiment – lends itself to fear of 
political change and, at least until the outbreak of the Arab Spring in early 2011, it seemed as 
though many Algerians were willing to accept a slow, gradual, and top-down process of 
democratization.  In a context where violence and bloodshed is the norm, a leader that brings 
peace and the stirrings of economic development may well be regarded as laying the groundwork 
for democracy.  Bouteflika has been keen to draw on and benefit from this image, and the results 
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in Figure 4 show that he is more likely than the other leaders in the study to cite peace as a 
prerequisite for democracy, while the results in Table 6 indicate that he is more likely to invoke 
security concerns5
On the question of promotion in our country of democracy and human rights, it 
must be remembered that it took in the West struggles, conflicts, and revolutions 
to establish democracy… Can we continue to put good governance as a 
prerequisite for better management of development problems, while 
undermining… the minimum social harmony on which good governance depends 
(Bouteflika 2000.02.18)? 
 and depict democracy as dangerous than the other leaders in the study.  
Likewise, the security first, democracy second approach also applies to Africa and the rest of the 
Third World in Bouteflika’s discourse: 
 
Algeria is emerging from this trial of more than 10 years, enriched by adversity, 
open to diversity… [B]ecause we are a pioneer of democracy in our region that so 
desperately needs it, our country can serve as an example. This is doubly true 
because we are driven by the desire to extinguish the conflict areas in Africa and 
to promote peace (Bouteflika 2002.09.16). 
 
If the vital prerequisites of social harmony, peace, and maturity are not met, the results of 
premature democratization could potentially be worse than Algeria in the 1990s: 
[T]he failure to assimilate and integrate the issues of capitalism, nationalism and 
democracy that crystallized in the sixteenth century in Europe, has resulted in 
destructive wars and excessive settlement projects, annihilated the entire southern 
area of the Earth and gave rise to racist ideas, fascism and Nazis who were 
responsible for two world wars suffered by humanity in its entirety (Bouteflika 
2005.02.06). 
 
The conflation of security and democracy is a direct challenge to the global-cultural norm, which 
tends to depict democracy as a tool for managing conflict and sees peace and security as a result.  
Still, it seems as though this characterization is at least somewhat popular in Algeria given 
Bouteflika’s 2005 re-election in spite of the ruling party apparatus and military opposition.  In 
Algeria, it is argued, the riskiness of democracy has been felt first-hand, and the need for an 
                                                 
5 While the relative risk ratio for Mubarak and Qaddafi are less than one (indicating lower odds of appearance), 
these fail to achieve statistical significance. 
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incremental, guided transformation may be seen as preferable to the threat of yet another decade 
of violence and bloodshed.  This experience is extrapolated to the rest of the developing world, 
where peace must be secured before democracy can safely be implemented – thus calling into 
question the usefulness of structural development projects and international interventions that do 
not deal first with the issue of security. 
 
Appropriated Discourse in Morocco – the Citizen-Monarch 
 The Moroccan King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne on July, 23 1999 upon the 
death of his father, King Hassan II, and is widely seen as a reformist modernizer, although many 
scholarly observers argue that the tentative political liberalization under Mohammed VI “has 
been used to allow the crown to regain a firm hold on power and rebuild its legitimacy” 
(Cavatorta 2001:189).  The centrality of the role of the monarchy plays a similar role to that of 
ruling parties in party-hegemonic regimes such as Ben Ali’s Tunisia and Mubarak’s Egypt 
(Maghraoui 2002; Cavatorta 2009), with co-optation required for participation in the political 
sphere (Cavatorta 2001) and the monarch playing the role of supreme arbitrator (Charrad 
2001:156–158).  Co-optation weakens oppositional coalitions and the King is ultimately 
responsible for breaking political deadlocks and handing down final rulings on subjects of 
political importance, and this “effectively makes the crown the real centre of power” despite 
elected bodies (Cavatorta 2009:189). 
 As a monarchy, however, the discourse of the ruling Moroccan Alaoui dynasty relies 
heavily on notions of a continuous histoire seculaire and religious language much more than the 
presidential regimes discussed earlier (Albrecht and Wegner 2006:129).  Article 19 of the 1972 
constitution designated the King as both the al-Mumathil al-Asamaa lil-Umma (Supreme 
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Representative of the Nation) and Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), titles which 
have remained intact in subsequent constitutions (Maghraoui 2002:28).  The title Amir al-
Mu’minin is a title dating back to Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet 
Muhammed and the first male convert to Islam, and appropriated by a number of Muslim rulers 
throughout history.  It is thus both a political and a religious title, identifying the Alaoui monarch 
as both the supreme religious authority of the country (Cavatorta 2001, 2009; Maghraoui 2002) 
and the only political entity permitted to rule on religious matters: 
Reform of the religious field [requires]… reform of the political sphere, an area 
par excellence of democratic expression differences of opinion… [U]nder the 
Moroccan constitutional monarchy, religion and politics do not meet except for at 
the level of the King, Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful)... We will 
also ensure that religious issues are treated within the Ulema Council and other 
appropriate authorities, and that acts of devotion are held in mosques and other 
appropriate places of worship, in full respect of freedom of religion, of which we 
are the guarantor (Mohammed VI 2004.07.30). 
 
Here we see the historical title of Amir al-Mu’minin used to traditionalize concepts of liberal 
governance, both by excluding religious debate and argument from the political sphere and in 
extending the King’s leadership to non-Muslims, thus guaranteeing both freedom of religion and 
religious tolerance.  Table 6 illustrates the prolific use of religious language and imagery in the 
Moroccan context – Mohammed VI is roughly twice as likely as his next closest peers, 
Bouteflika and Mubarak, to use religious language in his speeches dealing with democracy. 
 Historical continuity is also emphasized by Mohammed VI in a way that is largely absent 
in the discourse of the other leaders, as evidenced by Table 6 which shows that he is far more 
likely than the others to refer to previous Moroccan political leaders.  The King draws on a long 
Moroccan history of political independence from Ottoman rule (Charrad 2001:103) and the 
removal of the Spanish from the Western Sahara (known locally as the “Green March”) to 
emphasize the unifying and historically-relevant role of the Moroccan monarchy (Maghraoui 
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2002:26).  It is, in fact, the historical continuity of monarchy that separates Morocco from the 
eastern Arab countries: 
In respect to the Moroccan constitutional monarchy, I rise today to highlight its 
building blocks, namely Islam and democracy. For fourteen centuries, in fact, 
Moroccans chose to adopt Islam because it is the religion of balance, is based on 
tolerance, honors the dignity of man, embraces coexistence and rejects violence, 
extremism and the quest of power through religion. In light of these lessons our 
ancestors have built a civilization and Islamic state independent of the Mashreq 
caliphate, distinguished by its commitment to the single commander of believers 
(Mohammed VI 2003.07.30). 
 
Again, there are notions of the monarchy having been chosen by the Moroccan people for more 
than a thousand years.  Thus the existing monarchy is both indigenous and democratic, but must 
be supported by unwavering commitment to the monarch. 
 Mohammed VI uses these centralizing discourses of democracy to create an image of the 
Moroccan monarch as “an arbiter above politics—supposedly neutral vis-à-vis any group of 
society” (Albrecht and Wegner 2006:129).  He declares himself a citizen-monarch, responsible 
for the wellbeing of all Moroccans, the guarantor of peace, unity, independence, and social 
justice, inexorably linked to the people through the inter-generational social contract of bei’a 
(allegiance): 
We certainly will succeed, especially as we are motivated by a sincere 
nationalism, erecting the love of the homeland as an act of faith and based on a 
commitment to sacred constants, including your flawless harmony with your 
throne. If I am the incarnation and the custodian of the throne which is one of the 
oldest monarchies, my crown is like a crown on the head of every Moroccan, and 
that custody lies with each [of us]. You will find, dear people, in your first 
servant, a citizen-king, attached to your cause and dedicated to serving our 
beloved country, in keeping with the pact of bei’a (allegiance) that binds us to 
each other… I am proud to be Moroccan, and as your first-servant I am equal to 
all Moroccans in rights and obligations of citizenship, before God, nation and 
history (Mohammed VI 2005.11.16). 
 
In fact, however, the Moroccan constitution very clearly places sovereignty in the person of the 
King, limiting the role of elected government to the apolitical management of economic affairs 
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(Maghraoui 2002:30).  Mohammed VI retains agenda-setting and arbitration powers and 
encourages the election of technocrats: 
Our politicians of all leanings must consider these [political] deadlines as 
moments of mobilization and involvement in economic jihad and social 
development… [W]e now call for a ban on politicking that could lead the country 
into a premature election campaign (Mohammed VI 2000.01.13). 
 
Appointed officials are selected according to precise standards and are dismissed 
if they fail in their mission. However, the elite emanating from elections is 
distinguished by… the need to await the end of their term of elected which runs 
on years before they can reward or punish them. If, as regards the officials that I 
am responsible to appoint to their posts, I am anxious to choose the best elements 
to bring them to your disposition and your service, I expect that the voters also 
choose the best elements, in order that representative institutions are a strong 
support for the executive bodies. I therefore call on all citizens to ensure that 
elections highlight and demonstrate how Moroccans are imbued with the values 
of democracy and freedom, and virtues of moderation, tolerance and respect for 
law (Mohammed VI 2002.08.20). 
 
Thus economic concerns are elevated above political concerns (Maghraoui 2002), controlling the 
agenda and acting as a referee between elected representatives.  As such, appointment of elites 
takes on a democratic character and is arguably even more democratic than the election of elites, 
since the King represents the interests of all Moroccans.  The concept of alternance – occasional 
royal appointment of opposition governments – introduced by the late King Hassan II draws 
further attention to the centrality of the monarch as the impartial guarantor of democracy in spite 
of the fickle, ambition-driven nature of elected bodies (Cavatorta 2009). 
 Moroccan democracy is discursively defined as a constitutional, yet ruling, monarchy – a 
form of governance which is authentic and indigenous to Morocco.  This democracy requires 
uncritical acceptance of the monarchy, Islam, and the laws of the nation (Maghraoui 2002:28), 
and is defined by the monarch: 
Our constitutional monarchy is a fundamental text dating from 1962 which had 
been developed in close consultation with political parties of the era. In Morocco, 
the King does not merely reign. I reign and work with my government in a 
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constitutional framework that clearly defines the responsibilities of each 
(Mohammed VI 2001.09.04). 
 
Faithful to the unbreakable link of bei’a (allegiance) and reciprocal commitments 
that follow from it, we’ve worked, since our accession to the throne, to define the 
essential outlines of our proposed democratic and developed society, leaving it to 
constitutional institutions, political parties and forces of the nation contributing to 
the achievement of these guidelines (Mohammed VI 2004.07.30). 
 
Elections, so long as they result in the ascendance of a technocratic, apolitical elite, are taken as 
further evidence of the democraticness of the monarchy and the perfect symbiosis between the 
monarch and people: 
Each ballot deposited in the ballot box, all with complete freedom and 
spontaneity, confirms [your] Moroccanness and the perpetual renewal that binds 
[you] to the glorious Alawite Throne, in a climate of security, serenity, stability, 
and effective exercise of democracy (Mohammed VI 2003.11.06). 
 
In this articulation of democracy, questions of technocratic efficiency and honesty take 
precedence over questions of interest representation and the ultimate location of sovereignty 
(Maghraoui 2002:29), and thus the Moroccan situation resembles what some observers call a 
failed constitutional monarchy (Herb 2004).  This configuration of priorities and centralization of 
power in the hands of an unelected and unaccountable monarch represents a challenge to global-
cultural definitions of democracy, which tend to rely heavily on placing political power in the 
hands of competitive, elected bodies while emasculating the role of monarchs.  The adoption of a 
discourse of democracy is not a universal characteristic of contemporary monarchies, however, 
as some ruling monarchs have stressed the inapplicability of democracy in their countries and 
have resisted the implementation of written constitutions. 
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Appropriated Discourse in Libya – Direct Democracy 
 The late Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi came to power on September 1, 1969 in a 
military coup d’état, overthrowing the reigning monarch Idris I who had ruled the country since 
independence in 1951 (St John 2008:91), in a revolution reminiscent of Egypt’s led by Gamal 
Abd an-Nasser.  Qaddafi’s reign, which ended in 2011, was one of the longest surviving non-
monarchical regimes in the world, and his style of rule is often described as one of the most 
exemplary contemporary cases of Weberian charismatic leadership (Hinnebusch 1984:59).  
Often depicted as irrational and inconsistent (Totman and Hardy 2009; El-Kikhia 1997), 
Qaddafi’s revolutionary political philosophy married the ideas of Arab nationalism, positive 
political neutrality, socialism, and Arab unity at a time when all of these garnered widespread 
support across the Arab world (St John 2008:91).  While direct democracy is an extremely 
important aspect of this philosophy, in practice the Libyan political system is designed to 
centralize power, manage elite conflicts, and limit the emergence of viable challengers in a 
manner quite similar to several of the other countries in this study (Totman and Hardy 2009; St 
John 2008). 
 Despite marked inconsistencies in support for Arab nationalism, pan-Africanism, state 
socialism, and international terrorism throughout his tenure, Qaddafi has shown remarkable 
consistency in his reliance on direct democracy as the central theme of his political philosophy 
(St John 2008), as can be seen in Figure 1.  Qaddafi had actively been working on implementing 
his envisioned form of direct democracy before publishing his political manifesto – the Green 
Book – in 1975 (St John 2008:94) .  He called it jamahiri democracy – an Arabic neologism 
drawn from the same root as the word “republic” (jumhuriyya) although in the plural form – 
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which can be roughly translated as “of the masses” and is described as a political system of 
popular rule without political parties and representatives (Qaddafi, Jouve, and Parfitt 2005): 
At times we would be talking with someone and refer to people’s congresses and 
direct popular democracy, and he says, “We have parliaments just like you.” No, I 
want to explain the major difference between parliaments and congresses: 
congresses are bodies elected by the people, while congresses are made up of the 
people themselves. Thus, when we speak of a parliament we mean a body elected 
by the people, but when we speak of a congress we mean the people, all the 
people. For instance, in the jamahiri system in Libya, the people’s congresses 
comprise all the people, adult men and women who are legally accountable, and 
they are the ones who rule (Qaddafi 2005.09.19). 
 
The jamahiri system is described as a “third way” between communism and capitalism, and is 
alternatively referred to as the “Third Universal Theory”: 
Only the Third Universal Theory can solve the intricate problem of democracy.   
According to this theory, the democratic system is a cohesive structure whose 
foundations are firmly laid on basic popular congresses, people's committees and 
professional associations (Qaddafi 1983:43–44). 
 
Qaddafi rejects any political model developed outside of the Arab-Islamicate context on 
ideological grounds (Hinnebusch 1984:61), even resorting to blatant historical revision when 
necessary: 
Democracy is a composite Arabic word. It is made up of two words; “demo” 
which means people and “cracy” which means chairs or seats. It means that the 
people must always occupy the seat of power. Having real democracy means that 
the people must be the sole occupant of the seat of power… This is what the 
Green Book says (Qaddafi 2007.10.22). 
 
The word used by Qaddafi in this speech is a replication of democracy as pronounced in English 
(dimokrasi).  The contemporary word for democracy in Arabic – dimuqratiyya – is in fact a 
direct adoption of the original Greek word (Ayalon 1987:107). 
 Qaddafi’s political ideology is, at its core, a third-worldist, anti-imperialist challenge to 
the hegemonic world order (Hinnebusch 1984:60), as can be seen both in Figure 1 as well as the 
results in Table 6, which indicates that Qaddafi is almost 35 times more likely than his closest 
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peer – Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika – to accuse other countries of being façade democracies.  
This counter-hegemonic discourse of democracy entails a complete rejection of modern 
representative forms of democracy as inherently dictatorial: 
Democratically, there is no group whatever that can claim the right of 
representative supervision over the society. 'Society is its own supervisor.' Any 
pretension by any individual or group that it is responsible for law is dictatorship. 
Democracy means the responsibility of the whole society, and supervision should 
be carried out by the whole society. That is democracy (Qaddafi 1983:37) 
 
The dictatorial theory that is prevailing in the world now is called modern 
democracy or representative democracy, but it is not democracy. It consists of 
politicians and businessmen who are the capitalists who own the wealth. It is this 
wealth that that enables them to put whoever they want in power. Therefore there 
is an alliance between those who have the financial power and those who have the 
political power, while the people are deprived of this political potential and this 
economic potential (Qaddafi 2005.09.19). 
 
Pluralism is disparaged and political parties, which are legally banned in Libya (Totman and 
Hardy 2009:5), are rejected as dangerous and unnecessary: 
[Representative democracy] is the traditional democracy prevalent in the whole 
world, whether the system is one-party, two-party, multi-party or non-party. Thus 
it becomes clear that representation is fraud… Moreover, since the system of 
elected parliaments is based on propaganda to win votes, it is a demagogic system 
in the real sense of the word (Qaddafi 1983:19). 
 
If somebody suggests that a political party be established, what would be the use 
of it? Nobody will join it in a country where the people run their own affairs in 
direct democracy. Parties and partisanship are completely outdated. They belong 
in museums. This is the era of the masses. The world is full of parties that have 
never solved the problems of their societies… The ruling party in any country 
benefits only its members (Qaddafi 2005.07.23). 
 
Instead, political parties are to be replaced with people’s committees, which are dedicated to 
protecting and articulating something akin to the Rousseauean “General Will” (Hinnebusch 
1984:61).  To Qaddafi, this political ideology is inherently exportable and is, in fact, the only 
option for true democracy to exist: 
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Democracy has but one method and one theory. The disparity and dissimilarity of 
the systems claiming to be democratic is evidence that they are not democratic in 
fact. The people's authority has only one face and it can be realized only by one 
method, namely, popular congresses and people's committees. No democracy 
without popular congresses and committees everywhere (Qaddafi 1983:29). 
 
Despite his desire to spread his revolution and his overwhelming confidence in its absolute truth 
(Totman and Hardy 2009:7), Qaddafi’s ideology has largely failed to resonate outside of Libya 
(St John 2008:104). 
 Direct jamahiri democracy is coupled in Qaddafi’s ideology with concerns for 
revolutionary correctness, and the political reality in Libya during his reign reflects this.  The 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) – a permanent, unelected body set up after the removal 
of the monarchy – retains ultimate control over the jamahiri sector of the government in a 
fashion similar to the Iranian Guardian Council (Totman and Hardy 2009:4).  Qaddafi and his 
inner circle justify RCC interference in the people’s congresses by arguing the need to ensure the 
proper revolutionary orientation of society.  Qaddafi has expressed his disappointment in the 
tribal-particularist nature of the people’s congresses if left to their own devices (Hinnebusch 
1984:68), as it opposes the ideals of the jamahiri system: 
If a class, party, tribe or sect dominates a society, the whole system becomes a 
dictatorship… Under genuine democracy there is no excuse for one class to crush 
other classes for its own benefit, no excuse for one party to crush other parties for 
its own interests, no excuse for one tribe to crush other tribes for its own benefit 
and no excuse for one sect to crush other sects for its own interests… Such an 
action is dictatorial, because it is not in the interest of the whole society, which 
does not consist of only one class or tribe or sect or the members of one party 
(Qaddafi 1983:19). 
 
Likewise, Qaddafi describes his role not as a political ruler, but as a “Leader” or “Guide”, a 
prophetic “law-giver” and “teacher-leader” who is above everyday politics (Hinnebusch 1984; St 
John 2008).  He is not involved in furthering his own power – rather, the revolutionary jamahiri 
ideology itself insists that the RCC intervene in order to maintain the purity of the revolutionary 
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system.  Thus, so long as Libyans fail to live up to the standards of political virtue required by 
the Third Universal Theory, “Qaddafi must continuously intervene in the political process in an 
authoritarian fashion, in order to set things right” despite the fact that he is not a conventional 
political leader (Hinnebusch 1984:73). 
 Qaddafi is often labeled insane or – at the very least – eccentric by both Western and 
Arab observers, yet his very longevity and legacy may contradict this assessment.  Born into a 
Bedouin family, Qaddafi skipped grades in his primary education, has been called a master of the 
Arabic language, and has shown remarkable consistency in his theory of direct jamahiri 
democracy despite almost a half-century of global political changes (St John 2008).  Through 
discourse, Qaddafi based his very personalistic regime on a transcendent political ideology that 
served to set him above politics – not unlike Mohammed VI’s reliance on the transcendent 
characteristics of the Alaoui monarchy in Morocco, albeit without the reinforcement of a histoire 
seculaire.  Of the countries in the study, Qaddafi’s discourse of democracy presents the most 
direct challenge to the hegemonic global-cultural definition by rejecting it outright in its entirety 
and insisting that “there is no democracy at present” in the world, save his own "Great Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" (Qaddafi 2005.07.23).  Despite Western attempts at 
vilification and his historically-brutal treatment of his own people, Qaddafi has retained the 
image of a humanitarian possessed of great political wisdom in certain circles, and is admired for 
his reluctance to “sell out” (Totman and Hardy 2009:11–12) and accept Western-style 
representative democracy.  
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V. Conclusion 
The results of this study indicated that, contrary to the assumptions of world polity 
literature, discourses of democracy among North African autocrats are not entirely decoupled.  
Instead, the global norm of democracy is appropriated – accepted, redefined, and rearticulated 
through elite discourse.  These appropriated discourses bear hallmarks of both global cultural 
norms as well as attention to local institutions and interests.  In a similar vein, many demands of 
the participants of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions of early 2011, as well as the wider Arab 
spring, focused on the right to democratic self-governance in the face of repressive autocratic 
regimes. This revolutionary discourse of inclusive political freedom, however, did not develop in 
a vacuum – by necessity, activists responded to hegemonic conceptualizations of freedom and 
citizenship posited by ruling autocratic regimes.  As the Arab spring has illustrated, the elite’s 
hegemonic orientalist discourses were not accepted by the people in these societies. Millions of 
people of all ages, backgrounds, and beliefs insisted instead on expansive notions of freedom and 
democratic governance – in direct opposition to elite discourses of democracy.  Even here, 
however, hegemonic discourses are not rejected outright.  Instead, activists and opposition 
groups have called regimes to task: highlighting decoupling and empty promises on the one hand 
while simultaneously demanding the regime live up to its own articulated standards.  In a fashion 
strikingly similar to the demands of the velvet revolution for “socialism with a human face” 
(Žižek 2009), Arab protestors and revolutionaries have called for the perfection of the ideals 
articulated by autocratic elites: social justice, transparency, meaningful elections, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of religion. 
These results highlight the varied nature of appropriated discourses of democracy as 
filtered through the idiosyncrasies of each political context, but previous research indicates that 
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this kind of appropriation is not specific to the North African context, nor is it necessarily 
specific to authoritarian contexts in general.  As previously discussed, Nyerere’s ujamaa 
represents one such appropriation in a sub-Saharan African context (Stöger-Eising 2000), as do 
present-day discourses of democracy in communist and post-communist countries like China, 
Russia, Ukraine, and Romania (Dryzek and Holmes 2002).  Still other contexts have spawned 
other appropriations – including conceptualizations of “ethnic democracy” in apartheid South 
Africa (Giliomee 1997) and Israel (Smooha 1997).  Concepts related to democracy, such as 
freedom and liberty, also find various interpretations and appropriations in different contexts, 
such as East Asia (Kelly and Reid 1998).  The definitions of these concepts vary even in the 
liberal-democratic West – concepts of freedom advocated by American politicians, for example, 
include both desirable and undesirable types that vary in definition from politician to politician 
and between the two major parties (Easter 2008).  This indicates that these concepts are not 
absolute and universal but instead are appropriated for a particular use in a particular context. 
The most immediate next step for this project is the translation and coding of the 
approximately 80 excerpts which are only available in Arabic, although the vast majority of the 
excerpts have English or French translations and have already been included in the analysis.  
Methodologically, cluster analysis, multidimensional scaling, and network methods may provide 
a more fruitful statistical analysis than the multinomial regression model in this version of the 
study.  Intercoder reliability measures would help bolster the validity of the arguments made.  
Additionally, I plan on adding more references to Arab scholars and commentators writing in 
Arabic about this phenomenon, which will contribute to an authentic understanding of the way 
that these concepts and debates are discussed among Arab intellectuals.  Likewise, it will prove 
productive to include a more systematic comparison of the elite conceptualizations of democracy 
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with the drastic re-configuration of discourses of democracy initiated by the Arab spring and the 
fall of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Qaddafi. 
Despite the work yet to be done, this study offers important contributions to world polity 
literature, contemporary political theory, and the study of comparative “indigenous” 
democratization via an analysis of discourses of democracy among non-democratic elites in Arab 
North Africa.  The addition of the concept of appropriated discourses opens up avenues for 
future research, since other contested global norms – such as human rights, environmental 
sustainability, and women’s rights – are likely to be appropriated rather than accepted, 
decoupled, or rejected.  The appropriation of a global discourse does not preclude acceptance, 
decoupling, or rejection; the results of this study indicate that all four of these processes are at 
simultaneously at work in any given context as inter- and intradiscourses conflict with, converge 
with, and diverge from one another.  Future research may find that dominant global discourses 
are themselves appropriated – slowly-changing redefinitions of norms in sync with the issues and 
global zeitgeist, reconfigured to challenge rival discourses and justify the actions and policies of 
their articulators.  Regardless, the concept of discursive appropriation provides a valuable 
theoretical tool for the critical investigation of the contours of competing discursive formations 
that transcends the often ethnocentric mainstream approach.  
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APPENDIX A: CODING PROCESS 
The total volume of data consists of 1,742 speeches (sampling units) gathered from state 
information ministry websites.  In most instances, speeches were available in either English or 
French as well as in the original Arabic.  At this time, the only speeches analyzed are those with 
English or French translations.  Speeches were searched for truncated key terms (democ- in 
English and French, dimuqraaT- in Arabic) which were limited to democracy and its derivatives 
(democratic, democratization, etc.).  A subset of context units was created including only those 
in which the truncated key terms appear (roughly 46% of speeches).  Two specific usages of 
“democ-” related terms were removed from coding: names of countries or institutions (i.e., the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria) and the names of political parties (i.e., Tunisia’s 
Constitutional Democratic Rally).  Excluded terms were identified during the excerpting process. 
Coding unit excerpts were then identified based on a qualitative reading, beginning where 
the subject of democracy is initially introduced and ending when the subject is changed.  I chose 
this method over others – like having a computer program extract a certain number of words or 
characters around “democ-” terms – since some speeches go on at some length regarding 
democracy (and related subjects) while some relevant excerpts are only a sentence long.  This 
results in a good deal of variance in the length of the excerpts.  In addition, many speeches 
produced more than one excerpt; democracy as a subject of discussion is introduced, the subject 
is changed, and democracy is subsequently re-introduced.  Excerpts in French (and, in the future, 
in Arabic) were translated into English, with the original language of the excerpt stored in a 
separate file. 
Codes were developed on concepts anticipated prior to reading the speeches drawn from 
relevant scholarly literatures (i.e., corporatism, neoliberalism, fighting terrorism, elections, 
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indigenous democracy) as well as on themes encountered during the excerpting and coding 
processes (i.e., rights and duties, participation of citizens abroad, adversity).  While excerpting, I 
took notes on potential codes I came across and, before beginning the coding process, I consulted 
these notes to draw up codes that could apply to as many of the countries as possible.  Adversity, 
for example, is often mentioned in the context of problems created by “the long colonial night” 
in Algeria, whereas it is likely to be invoked in regards to the natural environment and local 
mismanagement in Morocco.  I made note of particularly important or vaguely translated 
passages and re-visited the Arabic originals to make sure that the intended meaning was captured 
as fully as possible.  For example, Abdelaziz Bouteflika mentions in a speech that “the people 
were consulted on” a particular issue.  In the Arabic original, the text reads “tamm istiftaa’ ash-
sh’ab fiiha” or “a people’s referendum was conducted on it” – this excerpt therefore was coded 
as making reference to a referendum (istiftaa’) rather than consultation (shura and its 
derivatives).  The result of the code development process was a set of 84 non-mutually exclusive 
codes. 
Excerpts were loaded into a custom computer program which presented a randomly-
selected excerpt devoid of context (date, speaker, audience, etc.) for coding, although in many 
cases this contextual information could be inferred from the text.  I kept track of the excerpts I 
coded each day by recording, in order, their randomly-assigned excerpt numbers.  This was 
helpful as I was able to indicate at what point a new code was added so that I would know that 
excerpts prior to that point needed to be revisited to make sure they were not miscoded.  For 
example, the code for “good governance” was added on August 8, 2001 after 23 excerpts had 
been coded.  These excerpts can easily be revisited to make sure that this code can be added, if 
necessary.  Some examples of coded excerpts follow: 
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The Constitutional Democratic Rally has optimally and carefully prepared for this 
symposium, especially as it takes place just after the presidential and legislative 
elections held in Tunisia last October 25. These elections constituted a major 
historic event, reflecting, once again, the degree of maturity our country has 
achieved and the solidity of the democratic pluralist edifice in our society. These 
elections were held within a climate of transparency and fair competition among 
all the lists of the political parties and the independent lists, thanks to the 
guarantees we have provided so that they clearly reflect the evolution of political 
life in our country, with due respect for the law and for the values and principles 
of the Republic. This has, in fact, been praised by the observers, from sisterly and 
friendly countries, who followed these elections. It has also been confirmed by the 
report of the National Elections Observatory (Ben Ali 2009.11.02). 
 
This excerpt was coded as including a positive definition of democracy consisting of elections, 
general will / loyalty, cultural maturity, pluralism, rule of law, territorial integrity, election 
monitors, reference to self / regime, vanguard party, with no temporal relationship.  Next: 
We seek international partnership to support our efforts, based on trade and 
investment rather than aid. We look forward to seeing the Middle East a region of 
peace, stability and prosperity. We are sure that building democratic and 
advanced societies, able to meet their peoples' needs and ambitions, is the means 
towards a better future that we deserve. It is also the guarantee to fulfill the 
promise of peace and prosperity for a new generation; the young of today and 
tomorrow (Mubarak 2006.05.20). 
 
This excerpt was coded as including a positive definition of democracy consisting of elections, 
international cooperation, neoliberalism, and peace / stability / security, with youth mentioned.  
Democracy is also mentioned as a prerequisite for development and peace, while there is no 
temporal relationship between demoracy, neoliberalism, and international cooperation.  Third: 
Algeria has begun to rise from its ruins. The state has found the strength to fulfill 
its obligations, the administrative structures to operate again. Politics is being 
rebuilt on a democratic basis with the emergence of several political parties that 
allow citizens to participate in public life.  And since we are currently negotiating 
an extremely dangerous turn to move towards a market economy, I hope that the 
turn is negotiated so that the public entrepreneur as the private contractor to bring 
us better results than socialism (Bouteflika 2001.10.18). 
 
This excerpt was coded as including a negative definition of democracy including neoliberalism 
as dangerous, and a positive definition of democracy consisting of neoliberalism as a potential 
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good, a strong state and political pluralism.  Mentions are made of adversity.  There are no 
temporal relationships.  Fourth: 
We urge everyone to show patriotism and citizenship in order to address the 
major challenge is to bring out an original Moroccan model for regionalization. 
Because it represents democratic development and the level of development 
achieved by our country, we want it to be a way to anchor the practice of good 
governance and ensure an upgrade for a major institutional reform. This is the 
most eloquent testimony of fidelity to the memory of our venerable Father, His 
late Majesty King Hassan II, God rest his soul, creator of the Green March and of 
the modern Moroccan state, which we responsibility to preserve the sovereignty 
and unity and to ensure its renewal while working for progress and development 
(Mohammed VI 2008.11.06). 
 
This excerpt was coded as containing a positive definition of democracy consisting of economic 
development, good governance, independence / self-determination (reference to the “Green 
March”), indigenous democracy, local democracy (reference to “regionalization”), and unity / 
solidarity.  Mentions are made to previous leaders, and there are no temporal relationships.  
Finally: 
My Green Book addresses the question of democracy. I hope you find it in 
English. I did not make up the Green Book or invent anything in it. I read the 
history of the world and followed the experience of humanity. I saw the reasons 
for war, peace, happiness, misery and external and internal problems. I compiled 
them in my book (Qaddafi 2007.10.22). 
 
This excerpt was coded as pure decoupling, with no definition given.  A mention is made to 
Qaddafi himself (reference to the “Green Book”). 
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APPENDIX B: CODING RULES 
General: 
 
“responsible” democracy => Def+ rights and duties 
“responsible” citizenship => Def+ rights and duties 
 
“our sovereignty” or “national sovereignty” => Def+ independence/self-determination 
 
“learning lessons” from past elections/experiences => Prox: avoiding setbacks 
 
No extremism / radicalism => Def+ tolerance 
 
“preparing administrators/executives” or “training elites” => Def+ technocracy 
 
Decentralization => Def+ local democracy 
 
“expression” => Def+ freedom of opinion 
 
Despite “differences of interest” => Def+ general will 
 
Inapplicability of “foreign” or “ready-made” models => Def+ indigenous democracy 
“authentic” or “true to identity” => Def+ indigenous democracy 
Reflecting “reality” of country/situation => Def+ indigenous democracy 
“specificities” => Def+ indigenous democracy 
“civilizational roots” => Def+ indigenous democracy 
Working with “available resources” => Def+ indigenous democracy 
“experiments” => Def+ indigenous democracy *CONTEXT* 
 
“resolving conflict” => Def+ peace/stability/security 
“civil concord” => Def+ peace/stability/security 
“national reconciliation” => Def+ peace/stability/security 
 
“family law” => Def+ women’s empowerment 
 
“martyrs” => Prox: adversity 
“challenges” and “dangers” => Prox: adversity 
 
“balanced” development => Def+ economic development AND Def+ economic equality 
“comprehensive” and “integrated” development => Def+ economic equality 
“human” development => Def+ economic equality 
“dignified life for all” => Def+ economic equality 
“socio-economic development” => Def+ economic equality 
 
“social development” => Def+ maturity/culture AND/OR Def+ economic equality *CONTEXT* 
 
 “national and local associations” => Def+ corporatism 
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Quotas/funding of political parties/associations/their presses => Def+ corporatism 
“official” unions / associations / parties => Def+ corporatism 
Talk about professions, sectors, etc => Def+ corporatism 
 
Democracy w/in political party => Def+ democratic centralism 
Unanimous acceptance after deliberation => Def+ democratic centralism 
 
Democracy “leaving open” or “creating environment” for hostility or manipulation => Def- 
anarchy AND/OR Def+ rights and responsibilities (depends on rest of context) 
 
“knowledge and information society” => Def+ bridging digital divide 
 
Inapplicability of hereditary/automatic succession => Def+ no monarchy 
 
Mention of UN, treaties, int’l law (w/o demanding reform) => Def+ int’l orgs/agreement/law 
Mention of UN, treaties, int’l law (w/ demanding reform) => Def+ int’l democracy 
 
Asking for slack, funds, trade w/ developed countries /  cooperation => Def+ int’l support/coop 
Finding its place in the int’l system => Def+ int’l support/coop 
“parliamentary diplomacy” / influencing int’l system => Def+ int’l support/coop 
Being recognized as democracy => Def+ int’l support/coop 
 
“uncaring” or “cold” or “without human face” neoliberalism => Def- neoliberalism 
“difficult” market development / liberalism => Def- neoliberalism 
 
“investments” and/or “economic openness” => Def+ neoliberalism 
“integrate with global economy” => Def+ neoliberalism 
 
“no unconstitutional changes of power” => Def+ no military rule AND Def+ constitutionalism 
 
“all generations” => Prox: youth 
 
Context-specific: 
 
(Algeria) Kabilye & others => Prox: Amazigh 
(Algeria) reconciliation / civil concord => Def+ peace/stability/security 
 
(Morocco) Tindouf & others => Prox: W. Sahara 
(Morocco) “proximity” => Def+ local democracy 
(Morocco) “autonomy” => Def+ local democracy 
(Morocco) “regionalization” => Def+ local democracy 
(Morocco) “Green March” => Def+ independence/self-determination, Prox: previous leaders 
(Morocco) “first servant” => Def+ monarch & people (bay’ah) 
(Morocco) “throne” => Def+ monarch & people (bay’ah) *CONTEXT* 
(Morocco) “sacred trust” => Def+ monarch & people (bay’ah) 
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(Tunisia) the Change => Prox: ref to self/regime 
(Tunisia) Chamber of Advisors => Def+ consultation (shura) AND Def+ corporatism 
(Tunisia) “components of society” => Def+ corporatism *CONTEXT* 
(Tunisia) “categories of society” => Def+ corporatism *CONTEXT* 
(Tunisia) state working to support the “associative fabric” => Def+ corporatism  
48 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Summary of Data 
  Country # speeches # mention democ % mention democ # excerpts 
Tunisia 404 129 32% 229 
Egypt 298 137 46% 241 
Morocco 272 160 59% 366 
Algeria 702 350 50% 550 
Libya 45 16 36% 81 
Total 1721 792 46% 1467 
 
  
49 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Summary of All Coded Variables 
  Variable Mean Name 
Positive Definition 0.93 def 
Negative Defintion 0.20 v8 
3rd World Democracy as Façade 0.02 def_3rd_world_democracy_as_faade 
Democracy as Anarchy 0.09 def_anarchy 
Bridging the Digital Divide 0.06 def_bridging_digital_divide 
Constitutionalism 0.14 def_constitutionalism 
Consultation (shura) 0.09 def_consultation_shura 
Corporatism 0.12 def_corporatism 
Democratic Centralism 0.27 def_democratic_centralism 
Direct Democracy 0.23 def_direct_democracy 
Economic Development 0.44 def_economic_development  
Economic Equality / Justice 0.34 def_economic_equality 
Education 0.12 def_education 
Elections 0.18 def_elections 
Freedom of Opinion / Press 0.11 def_freedom_of_opinion 
General Will / Nat'l Interest 0.12 def_general_willloyaltynatl_inte 
Good Governance 0.14 def_good_governance 
Indepdenence / Self-Determination 0.14 def_independenceselfdeterminatio 
Independent Judiciary 0.06 def_independent_judiciary 
Indigenous Democracy 0.22 def_indigenous_democracy 
International Democracy 0.09 def_intl_democracy 
International Organizations / Agreements 0.13 def_intl_orgsagreementslaw 
International Support / Cooperation 0.19 def_intl_supportcooperation 
Democracy Bounded by Islam 0.01 def_islambounded 
Democracy Compatible with Islam 0.05 def_islamcompatible 
Keeping Pace With the Times 0.10 def_keeping_pace_w_times  
Local / Municipal Democracy 0.12 def_local_democ 
Democracy as Cultural Maturity 0.14 def_maturityculture 
Loyalty to the Monarch (bei'a) 0.06 def_monarch__people_bayah 
Neoliberalism (negative) 0.07 def_neoliberalism_neg 
Neoliberalism (positive) 0.16 def_neoliberalism_pos 
Corporatism Inimical to Democracy 0.01 def_no_corporatism 
Elections Inimical to Democracy 0.01 def_no_elections 
Military Rule Inimical to Democracy 0.02 def_no_military_rule 
No Automatic Succession 0.01 def_no_monarchy 
Capitalism Inimical to Democracy 0.01 def_no_neoliberalism 
Pluralism Inimical to Democracy 0.01 def_no_pluralism 
No Ethnic / Racial Democracy 0.03 def_no_racismethnic_democracy 
Referenda Inimical to Democracy 0.00 def_no_referenda 
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Church / State Separation 0.02 def_no_religion_in_politics 
Representation Inimical to Democracy 0.01 def_no_representation 
Preventing Terrorism 0.09 def_no_terrorism 
Participation of Citizens Abroad 0.02 def_participation_of_citizens_ab  
Peace / Stability / Security 0.32 def_peacestabilitysecurity 
Pluralism 0.24 def_pluralism 
Referenda 0.03 def_referenda 
Representation 0.07 def_representation 
Rights and Duties 0.12 def_rights_and_duties 
Rule of Law 0.21 def_rule_of_law 
Separation of Powers 0.02 def_separation_of_powers 
Strong State 0.07 def_strong_state 
Technocracy 0.04 def_technocracy 
Territorial Integrity 0.06 def_territorial_integrity 
Tolerance 0.09 def_tolerance  
Transparency 0.07 def_transparency 
Unity / Solidarity 0.27 def_unitysolidarity 
Democracy as a Universal Value 0.08 def_universal_values 
Western Democracy as Façade 0.07 def_western_democracy_as_faade 
Women's Empowerment 0.09 def_womens_empowerment 
(Mention) Adversity 0.23 prox_adversity 
(Mention) Africa 0.11 prox_africa 
(Mention) Avoiding Setbacks 0.05 prox_avoiding_setbacks 
(Mention) Colonialism 0.04 prox_colonialism 
(Mention) Election Monitors 0.02 prox_election_monitors 
(Mention) Globalization 0.05 prox_globalization 
(Mention) Iraq 0.03 prox_iraq 
(Mention) Islamic / Arab Civilization 0.11 prox_islamicarab_civ  
(Mention) Israel / Palestine 0.05 prox_israelpalestine 
(Mention) Lebanon 0.01 prox_lebanon 
(Mention) Military / Armed Forces 0.03 prox_military 
(Mention) Police 0.01 prox_police 
(Mention) Previous Leaders 0.05 prox_previous_leaders 
(Mention) Quotas 0.01 prox_quotas 
(Mention) Reference to Self / Regime / Party 0.40 prox_ref_to_selfregime 
(Mention) Religious Language 0.10 prox_religious_language 
(Mention) Shari'a 0.00 prox_sharia 
(Mention) Unions 0.02 prox_unions 
(Mention) Party as Vanguard 0.03 prox_vanguard_party 
(Mention) Western Sahara 0.04 prox_w_sahara 
(Mention) Youth 0.11 prox_youth 
Prerequisite for Democracy 0.11 temp_prereq_for_democ 
No Temporal Relationship 0.92 temp_no_temp_relationship 
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Democracy as a Prerequisite 0.05 temp_democ_as_prereq 
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TABLE 3 
 
Aggregate Variable Example 
 Variable Mean Type 
Representative Democracy (+) 0.36 aggregate 
Representation 0.07 component 
Elections 0.18 component 
Referenda 0.03 component 
Pluralism 0.24 component 
Participation of Citizens Abroad 0.02 component 
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TABLE 4 
 
All Aggregate Variables and Components 
  Variable Mean Type 
Representative Democracy (positive) 0.36 aggregate 
Representation 0.07 component 
Elections 0.18 component 
Referenda 0.03 component 
Pluralism 0.24 component 
Participation of Citizens Abroad 0.02 component 
Representative Democracy (negative) 0.02 aggregate 
No Elections 0.01 component 
No Pluralism 0.01 component 
No Referenda 0.00 component 
No Representation 0.01 component 
Restrictions on Government 0.13 aggregate 
Separation of Powers 0.02 component 
Transparency 0.07 component 
Independent Judiciary 0.06 component 
Election Monitors 0.02 component 
Façade Democracy 0.08 aggregate 
3rd World Democracy as Façade 0.02 component 
Western Democracy as Façade 0.07 component 
Authentic Democracy 0.33 aggregate 
Indigenous Democracy 0.22 component 
Independence / Self-Determination 0.14 component 
Democracy as Compatible with Islam 0.05 component 
Democracy as Bounded by Islam 0.01 component 
Shari'a 0.00 component 
Greater Good 0.19 aggregate 
Rights and Duties 0.12 component 
General Will / National Interest 0.12 component 
Global Culture 0.40 aggregate 
Democracy as Universal Value 0.08 component 
Keeping Pace With the Times 0.10 component 
Int’l Organizations / Agreements / Law 0.13 component 
International Support / Cooperation 0.19 component 
Globalization 0.05 component 
Governmentality 0.17 aggregate 
Technocracy 0.04 component 
Good Governance 0.14 component 
Hotspots 0.06 aggregate 
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Iraq 0.03 component 
Israel/Palestine 0.05 component 
Lebanon 0.01 component 
Difficult / Dangerous Democracy 0.32 aggregate 
Avoiding Setbacks 0.05 component 
Adversity 0.23 component 
Democracy as Anarchy 0.09 component 
Colonialism 0.04 component 
Security-as-Democracy 0.35 aggregate 
Peace / Stability / Security 0.32 component 
Fighting Terrorism 0.09 component 
Military 0.03 component 
Police 0.01 component 
Developmental Nationalism 0.46 aggregate 
Bridging Digital Divide 0.06 component 
Economic Development 0.44 component 
Social Justice 0.35 aggregate 
Economic Equality / Justice 0.34 component 
Capitalism as Inimical to Democracy 0.01 component 
Vanguard Centralism 0.04 aggregate 
Democratic Centralism 0.03 component 
Vanguard Party 0.03 component 
Corporatism 0.13 aggregate 
Corporatism1 0.12 component 
Unions 0.02 component 
Liberal Governance 0.12 aggregate 
No Racism / Ethnic Democracy 0.03 component 
Church / State Separation 0.02 component 
Tolerance 0.09 component 
Alternation of Power 0.03 aggregate 
Military Rule Inimical to Democracy 0.02 component 
No Automatic Succession 0.01 component 
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TABLE 5: List of variables used in analysis and descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Definition (-) 0.20 0.40 
Definition (+) 0.93 0.25 
Representative Democracy (+) 0.36 0.48 
Restrictions on Government 0.13 0.34 
Freedom of Opinion 0.11 0.31 
Constitutionalism 0.14 0.34 
Rule of Law 0.21 0.41 
International Legitimacy 0.39 0.49 
Education 0.12 0.33 
Liberal Governance 0.12 0.33 
Alternation of Power 0.03 0.17 
Governmentality 0.17 0.38 
Women's Empowerment 0.09 0.29 
Youth 0.11 0.32 
Greater Good 0.19 0.40 
Vanguard Centralism 0.04 0.19 
Corporatism 0.13 0.34 
Consultation (shura) 0.09 0.29 
Local Democracy 0.12 0.33 
Maturity / Culture 0.24 0.43 
Reference to Self / Regime / Party 0.40 0.49 
Representative Democracy (-) 0.02 0.15 
Democracy as Difficult / Dangerous 0.32 0.47 
Security 0.35 0.48 
Developmental Nationalism 0.46 0.50 
Social Justice 0.35 0.48 
International Democracy 0.09 0.28 
Africa 0.11 0.32 
Islamic / Arab Unity 0.11 0.31 
Neoliberalism (-) 0.07 0.26 
Direct Democracy 0.02 0.15 
Authentic Democracy 0.33 0.47 
Citizen Monarchy (bei'a) 0.06 0.24 
Territorial Integrity 0.06 0.24 
Unity / Solidarity 0.27 0.44 
Previous Leaders 0.05 0.22 
Religious Language 0.10 0.30 
Façade Democracy 0.07 0.26 
Hotspots 0.06 0.23 
Strong State 0.07 0.25 
56 
 
Western Sahara 0.04 0.20 
Neoliberalism (+) 0.16 0.37 
Quotas 0.01 0.11 
Prerequisite for Democracy 0.11 0.32 
No Temporal Relationship 0.92 0.27 
Democracy as a Prerequisite 0.05 0.22 
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TABLE 6: Multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by speech, 
country by IVs of interest, relative risk ratios (Algeria omitted reference category) 
     
VARIABLES Tunisia Morocco Egypt Libya 
     
Neoliberalism (+) 0.211*** 1.170 1.313 1.47e-06*** 
 (0.075) (0.244) (0.279) (7.66e-07) 
Neoliberalism (-) 0.654 1.133 0.041*** 0.013*** 
 (0.350) (0.348) (0.042) (0.009) 
Citizen Monarchy (bei’a) 5.96e-07*** 52.77*** 5.01e-07*** 9.98e-06*** 
 (6.07e-07) (53.34) (5.11e-07) (1.24e-05) 
Vanguard Centralism 74.30*** 3.649 37.91*** 5.96e-06*** 
 (56.19) (4.064) (28.53) (5.07e-06) 
Corporatism 9.273*** 2.089** 1.546 5.19e-07*** 
 (2.617) (0.606) (0.485) (4.33e-07) 
Security 0.496*** 0.668** 0.986 0.509 
 (0.116) (0. 125) (0.194) (0.219) 
Dangerous / Difficult Democracy 0.475*** 0.716* 0.541*** 0.136*** 
 (0.109) (0.134) (0.094) (0.083) 
Façade Democracy 0.239** 0.037** 0.702 34.99*** 
 (0.172) (0.053) (0.319) (12.96) 
Direct Democracy 2.21e-13*** 2.13e-15*** 4.72e-15*** 405.94*** 
 (2.34e-13) (2.16e-15) (4.87e-15) (418.09) 
Reference to Self / Regime 10.10*** 3.787*** 3.398*** 1.592 
 (2.481) (0.708) (0.641) (1.027) 
Religious Language 0.321** 2.002** 1.297 0.025*** 
 (0.161) (0. 710) (0.502) (0.016) 
Previous Leaders 3.268 23.10*** 1.84e-07*** 2.76e-06*** 
 (2.812) (14.78) (2.09e-07) (2.10e-06) 
     
Observations 1,436 1,436 1,436 1,436 
     
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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FIGURE 2: Mentions of military and police over speaker 
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FIGURE 3: Mean of neoliberalism (+) in Egypt by year 
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FIGURE 4: Mean security as a prerequisite for democracy, by speaker 
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